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WARNING: YOUR TOBACCO SPONSORSHIP MAY BE
HAZARDOUS TO OUR NATION'S HEALTH
I. INTRODUCTION
"I'll tell you why I like the cigarette business. It costs a
penny to make. Sell it for a dollar. It's addictive. And
there's fantastic brand loyalty."1
Events such as Nascar's Winston Cup, World Cup Soccer,
Cigarette boat races, America's Cup, Wimbledon and the
Superbowl display an array of athletic achievement and are known
world wide. Consequently, so are the event sponsors, many of
whom are tobacco companies. Until recently, not many people
seemed to mind the association between tobacco products and
sporting events. Now, however, the battle to eliminate tobacco
sponsorship has become as competitive as the sporting events
themselves.
Since the 1600s, tobacco has incited controversy due to its re-
ported health risks.2 Despite the negative publicity tobacco has re-
ceived, tobacco companies have stayed competitive, have protected
their profits and have kept many citizens of the world smoking.3
1. PHILIPJ. HILTS, SMOKESCREEN 1 (1996) (quoting American Warren Buffett,
investment specialist). As one example of just how lucrative the tobacco business
can be, consider that in the United States, tobacco profits in 1993 were $46 billion.
See Richard Harwood, The Anti-Tobacco Push: Smoke and Mirrors, INT'L HERALD TRIB.
(US), Sept. 18, 1996, at Opinion Sec.
2. See S. WAGNER, CIGARETTE COUNTRY- TOBACCO IN AMERICAN HISTORY AND
POLITICS (1971). In the 1400s, Christopher Columbus reported to Europe that
Native Americans smoked the leaves for pleasure. See id. The first medical report
of the effects of tobacco was in 1665, when a cat died from drinking "a drop of
distilled oil of tobacco." STANTON A. GLANTz, THE CIGARETrE PAPERS 1 (1996).
Initial investigations suggested that smoking caused cancer, and in the early 1950s,
two professors, Richard Doll and Austin Bradford-Hill, published the first study
which examined the link between smoking and lung cancer. See Nicholas Hellen,
EC Ad Ban Goes Up in Smoke, EVENING STANDARD, Dec. 9, 1992, at 31. In 1964, the
U.S. Surgeon General officially announced that smoking causes lung cancer. See
PUBLIC HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE, PUB. No. 1103,
SMOKING AND HEALTH, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMM. TO THE SURGEON GENERAL
OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERV. (1964). The first health warnings were placed on
cigarette packages in 1971. See Hellen, supra at 31. From 1971 to present, tobacco
companies and governments have been working to establish the advertising limits
for tobacco products. See id. One 1992 report, in fact, shows that banning ciga-
rette advertising does reduce the number of people who take up smoking. See id.
3. See P. TAYLOR, THE SMOKE RING: TOBACCO, MONEY, AND MULTI-NATIONAL
POLITICS (1984). In 1995, Philip Morris Companies, Inc., the largest tobacco com-
(165)
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Tobacco companies have been able to accomplish this goal largely
through major advertising efforts and strong political support.4
Now, however, in light of the disparaging medical evidence
concerning tobacco, many nations are making an effort to curb the
smoking habits of their citizens by limiting the exposure of their
children to cigarette advertising.5 This limitation on children's ex-
posure to advertising is based on the theory that those who start
smoking as youngsters are more likely to continue smoking
throughout their adult years.6 Perhaps the most widely publicized
government crackdown on youth-oriented advertising involved a
controversial cigarette logo featuring Joe Camel, a cartoon-like
camel associated with Camel cigarettes. 7
pany in the United States, increased its income from sales of domestic cigarettes by
13% and its worldwide sales of cigarettes by 16%. See PHILIP MORIs COMPANIES,
INC., 1995 ANNUAL REPORT 6 (1996). Philip Morris sold nearly 600 billion ciga-
rettes overseas in 1995 and plans to hire more employees to maintain its domestic
and international success. See id.
Studies show that tobacco products are still in demand. For example, the
World Health Organization reported that 1.1 billion people smoke world wide. See
Sonni Efron, Lighting Up World of Smokers, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1996, at Al.
Although health concerns in countries like the United States and Canada have
reduced the demand for tobacco products, tobacco companies have been able to
recover losses by expanding their market to developing countries. See id.
Tobacco companies are not the only parties to profit. Federal and state gov-
ernments collect over $13 billion per year from taxes on tobacco products, and $2
billion per year goes to the media for advertising. See Harwood, supra note 1, at
Opinion Sec. The United States Agriculture Department has determined that to-
bacco products are "worth $49 billion, used by one-fourth of the adult population,
grown on 124,000 farms and contribut[e] $13 billion in excise taxes . " Id.
4. See generally, GLANTZ, supra note 2.
5. For a discussion of how some countries are trying to limit their citizen's
exposure to tobacco advertising, see infra notes 19-98 and accompanying text.
6. See Sarah Scott, Do Tobacco Ads Work on Teens?: Debate Rages over Ottawa's
Planned Restrictions, MONTREAL GAZETrE, Mar. 15, 1997, at Al. Tobacco companies
hope that teen users, known as the "starter market," choose their company's prod-
ucts, based on evidence that few smokers change brands once they are hooked on
smoking. See id.; see also Shankar Vedantam, Battle Set to Begin over Tobacco Rules,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 9, 1997, at A8. The commissioner of the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), David Kessler, explained that most smokers take up the
habit at a young age, so "reducing smoking among youths will, over time, reduce
the number of adult smokers." Id.
7. See Michael Conlon, Cigarette Makers Trying to Target Children, Researchers Say,
REUTERS N. Am. WIRE, Dec. 10, 1991. Opponents of tobacco advertising argued
that the tobacco company's use of a cartoon camel, otherwise known as "Joe
Camel," in its cigarette advertisements appealed to young viewers. See id. In 1991,
the American Medical Association conducted a study which revealed that 51.1% of
229 pre-school aged children identified the Joe Camel character with the Camel
brand of cigarettes; 48.9% of the same children matched the Walt Disney World
"ears" with Mickey Mouse; and 90% of the children could not match the warning
label which appears on cigarette packages with cigarettes. See Paul M. Fischer et
al., Brand Logo Recognition by Children Aged 3 to 6 Years: Mickey Mouse and Old Joe the
Camel, 266JAMA 3145 (1991). See also Richard Heyman, Protect Kids from Joe Camel,
[Vol. 5: p. 165
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In order to effectively limit children's exposure to cigarette ad-
vertising, many countries are attempting to limit tobacco advertis-
ing and sponsorship at sporting events.8 These efforts are fueled by
the theory that limiting the exposure of children to "anti-health"
advertising will cause a decline in the number of children who take
up smoking.9 Countries have targeted advertising at sporting
events to lower the risk of exposure to youths who presumably asso-
ciate sports, and therefore smoking, with that which is "cool."10 In
J. CoM. 8A (Oct. 3, 1996) (explaining over half of children ages three through six
identify Joe Camel with cigarettes, based on 1995 study).
In response, the United States Federal Trade Commission (FTC) investigated
R.J. Reynolds' advertising tactics and eventually filed a complaint against the to-
bacco company, alleging that the Joe Camel campaign was an illegal attempt to
promote a dangerous and addictive product to children. See Crossfire: Is the FTC's
Attack and Ultimate Win Against the Use of Joe Camel as a Mascot a Blow Against Free
Speech? (Cable News Network (CNN) television broadcast, May 31, 1997) (discuss-
ing free speech implications of FTC's decision to ban tobacco company's use of
Joe Camel as mascot). In addition to the FTC's action against the tobacco com-
pany, at least one state court determined that it would allow a resident to prose-
cute R.J. Reynolds for the Joe Camel ad campaign, which violated a state law
forbidding companies to promote cigarette sales to minors. See Mangini v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 875 P.2d 73, 78 (Cal. 1994) (holding state attempts to regu-
late sale of cigarettes are not preempted by federal law).
For further details on the Joe Camel controversy, see Mary B. Meaden, Com-
ment, Joe Camel and the Targeting of Minors in Tobacco Advertising: Before and After 44
Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 31 NEw ENG. L. REv. 1011 (1997) (explaining effect
of Joe Camel tobacco advertising on children); Crossfire: How Cool is Joe Camel?
(CNN television broadcast, Mar. 20, 1992) (discussing whetherJoe Camel cigarette
mascot should be banned).
8. Sponsorship is "an investment in an activity or event that can be exploited
commercially." Tanya Hughes, Successful Sponsorship Hinges on Creating a Synergy
Between Brand and Event, BRAND STRATEGY, Sept. 30, 1994, at 1. Sponsorship Re-
search International, a research group specializing in sponsorships, determined
that 87% of consumers believed a company's sponsorship of an event meant that
the company contributed significant financial aid to the event. See id. Based on
this belief, consumers purchased the sponsoring company's product, in an attempt
to help support the event. See id.
9. See Tobacco Advertising and Youth: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Com-
merce, Science and Transportation, 1997 WL 14150812 (Sept. 16, 1997) (statement of
Matthew L. Myers, Executive Vice President and General Counsel for National
Center for Tobacco-Free Kids). But see Simon Chapman, Unraveling Gossamer with
Boxing Gloves: Problems in Explaining the Decline in Smoking, 307 Bar. MED. J. 429
(1993) (explaining decline in smoking rate cannot be attributed to restrictions on
tobacco advertising alone, since continuous outside variables also affect smokers'
decisions to quit smoking). For an example of how much publicity sporting events
receive, consider that in England in 1987, sporting events sponsored by tobacco
companies received 366 hours of television air time. See Alan Fraser, Seeing Through
the Smokescreen, INDEP. (Eng.), Mar. 10, 1990, at 54.
10. See Peter Roebuck, Tobacco and Sport Remain a Deadly Mixture, SUNDAY
TIMES (Eng.),June 23, 1991, at Sport Sec. (explaining many smokers take up habit
during teenage years, because "tobacco has been brilliantly marketed as rebellious,
seductive and cool"). Children are "very impressionable and therefore vulnerable
to the sophisticated marketing techniques employed by the tobacco industry ...
that associate the use of tobacco products with excitement, glamour, and indepen-
1998]
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support of this premise, the United States has suggested that sports
sponsorship "provides an opportunity for 'embedded advertising'
that actively creates a 'friendly familiarity' between tobacco and
sports enthusiasts, many of whom are children and adolescents.""'
These new restrictions are creating controversy in the sporting
industry, a venue to which the tobacco companies turned as an al-
ternative to television advertising. 12 Those who oppose advertising
tobacco products at sporting events argue that sports exemplify "life
and vitality," while tobacco kills more and more people every year.1 3
Proponents of tobacco sponsorship of sporting events argue that
tobacco sponsorship should be legal since tobacco itself is legal.' 4
This Comment provides an overview of restrictions on tobacco
advertising at sporting events implemented by Australia, the United
States, Canada and France,' 5 and the tobacco industry's legal chal-
lenges to these restrictions. Part II of this paper explores the evolu-
tion of case opinions and recent laws passed or pending in
Australia, Canada, the United States and France, which severely
limit or completely ban tobacco sponsorship and advertising at
sporting events. 16 Part III analyzes the legal challenges set forth by
both the tobacco industry and opponents of tobacco sponsorship.1 7
In conclusion, Part IV assesses the impact of more stringent tobacco
regulations on the worldwide sporting community.18
dence." Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and
Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396,
44,527 (Aug. 28, 1996) (hereinafter Regulations).
11. Regulations, supra note 10, at 44,527.
12. See Hughes, supra note 8, at 1. Many people believe it is wrong to adver-
tise tobacco products at sporting events because tobacco products are harmful. See
id. Proponents of tobacco sponsorship argue that sports sponsorship is a legiti-
mate venue for tobacco advertising, since sponsorship is increasingly becoming
one of the few means for advertising tobacco products. See id.
13. See Roebuck, supra note 10, at Sport Sec.
14. See Peter Lawson, Without the Weed Sport Would Wither, SUNDAY TIMES
(Eng.), June 30, 1991, at Sport Sec.
15. These countries have been selected based on their recent developments
relating to tobacco sponsorship and the varying perspectives offered by their ap-
proach to this controversial issue.
16. For a discussion of the current legislation and underlying history of to-
bacco regulations, see infra notes 19-98 and accompanying text.
17. For an analysis of the arguments set forth by both the tobacco industry
and the nations involved in the tobacco legislation, see infra notes 99-140 and ac-
companying text.
18. For a discussion of the impact of current and proposed tobacco regula-
tions on the sporting world, see infra notes 141-52 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 5: p. 165
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II. BACKGROUND
Several countries have already passed broad laws regulating the
tobacco industry, or are currently in the process of doing so. This
section will explore the current state of the restrictions of tobacco
advertising at sporting events in Australia, Canada, France and the
United States, and the history underlying the regulations.
A. Australia
The Broadcasting and Television Act of 1942 (BTA) was the
first attempt by the Australian government to regulate television ad-
vertising for tobacco products. 19 This law required that tobacco
companies include a warning of the health risks of smoking in their
cigarette advertisements. 20 In 1976, the BTA was amended by the
Broadcasting and Television Amendment Act (BTAA) to com-
pletely prohibit the direct advertising of cigarettes. 21
Despite tougher restrictions on tobacco advertising, tobacco
companies were sometimes able to get television exposure if the
advertisement of their product was "accidental or incidental."22
19. Broadcasting and Television Act, 1942 (Austl.). Australia's Broadcasting
and Television Act of 1942 was amended in 1972 to require licenses to include a
health warning with cigarette advertisements. See Broadcasting and Television Act,
1972, § 100A (Austl.). Section 100A(1) provided in pertinent part, "A licensee
shall cause each advertisement for cigarettes or cigarette tobacco broadcast or tele-
vised from his station to be followed immediately.., by the following statement: -
'Medical authorities warn that smoking is a health hazard.'" Id.
The Australian Parliament had the power to regulate broadcasting by virtue of
the Commonwealth Constitution, which provides that the Parliament may make
laws "with respect to . . . telegraphic, telephonic, and other like services." See
AusmL. CONST. § 51(v).
20. See Broadcasting and Television Act, 1972, § 100A (Austl.).
21. Broadcasting and Television Amendment Act (BTAA), 1976, § 100(5A).
Section 100(5A) provides, "A licensee shall not broadcast or televise an advertisement
for, or for the smoking of cigarettes or cigarette tobacco." Id. (emphasis added). The
1976 amendment provided an exception when the broadcast was "an accidental or
incidental accompaniment of the broadcasting or televising of other matter in cir-
cumstances in which the licensee does not receive payment or other valuable con-
sideration for broadcasting or televising the advertising matter." Id. § 100(10).
The 1976 Amendment repealed Section 100A of the BTA, which had required that
health warnings accompany cigarette advertisements. See id. § 6. For a discussion
of the BTA, see supra note 20 and accompanying text.
22. Id. § 100(10). For example, if a television station is broadcasting a sport-
ing event, and a billboard for a cigarette brand is in the background, the broadcast
of the billboard would not be a violation of the BTA. Legislative history reveals
that section 100(10) allows:
[P]eripheral or perimeter advertising.... Advertising of slogans on bill-
boards or fences around sporting ovals is permitted providing there is not
abuse of the intention of the legislation .... As I understand it, it also
would be possible for sponsorship by particular sponsors to continue so
long as it was not sponsorship in the direct sense of sponsoring certain
19981
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Australian courts have interpreted the term "accidental or inciden-
tal" in two significant cases: Benson and Hedges Co. v. Australian
Broadcasting Tribunal,23 and Action on Smoking and Health, Ltd. v. Aus-
tralian Broadcasting Tribunal.24
In Benson and Hedges, the court examined four separate allega-
tions of the Benson and Hedges Company's violation of the BTA.25
By utilizing the policy statement of the Australian Broadcasting Tri-
bunal,2 6 the Benson and Hedges court determined that the tobacco
company expressly violated section 5 (A) of the BTA on three of the
four occasions in question. 27 On one occasion, however, the court
cigarettes or cigarette tobacco. So those aspects do not cut across the
intentions of the legislation at all.
Re: The Benson and Hedges Co. (1984), Nos. G172-75, at 1 49 (Fed. Ct. of Austl.,
N.S.W. Dist. Registry), affd, Rothmans of Pall Mall, Ltd. v. Australian Broad. Tribu-
nal (1985) 58 A.L.R. 675 (citing Minister's Second Reading Speech introducing
Broadcasting and Television Amendment Bill of 1976 to House (statement of Sen.
Carrick, responsible for bill)).
23. See Re: The Benson and Hedges Co. (1984), Nos. G172-75, at 49 (Fed.
Ct. of Austl., N.S.W. Dist. Registry), affd, Rothmans of Pall Mall, Ltd. v. Australian
Broad. Tribunal (1985) 58 A.L.R. 675.
24. (1992) 27 A.L.D. 709.
25. See Re: The Benson and Hedges Co. (1984), Nos. G172-75, at 49 (Fed.
Ct. of Ausdl., N.S.W. Dist. Registry), affid, Rothmans of Pall Mall, Ltd. v. Australian
Broad. Tribunal (1985) 58 A.L.R. 675.
26. See id. 1 3 (citing Tribunal's Policy Statement issued Dec. 29, 1983, POS
07). The policy statement issued by the Tribunal set forth the views of the court
on the interaction between sections 100(5A) and 100(10). See id.
The policy statement suggested that before determining whether an advertise-
ment falls within the section 100(10) "accidental or incidental" exception, a court
must first consider (1) whether the item is an advertisement; and (2) if so, whether
it is an advertisement for the smoking of cigarettes. See id.
The policy statement also defined an "advertisement" as "matter which draws
the attention of the public, or a segment thereof, to a product, service, person,
organization, or line of conduct in a manner calculated to promote or oppose,
directly or indirectly, that product, service, person, organization or line of con-
duct." Id.
27. See id. 1 14. The three incidents which amounted to a violation of the
BTA were as follows: First, the court determined that a television script promoting
a Cricket match, which referred to the "first Benson and Hedges Test," displayed
the Benson and Hedges logo, and concluded with "proudly brought to you by the
Benson and Hedges Company" was an advertisement within section 5(A) of the
BTA. Id. 20-21. The court acknowledged that there was a difference between
advertising for cigarettes, and advertising a corporate name; however, the court
did not find this distinction to be persuasive in this scenario:
I do not doubt that there can be a 'corporate image' which is reasonably
distinct from the products sold or produced by the corporation. The
question is, however, whether it was reasonably open to the [lower tribu-
nal] to conclude in the present case that the products also were being
advertised . .. the answer to this question must be a clear affirmative.
Id. 1 21. The court's analysis ended with its determination that Benson and
Hedges violated section 5(A) of the BTA. Id. 1 23. As a result, the court did not
determine whether Benson and Hedges' advertisement was "accidental or inciden-
[Vol. 5: p. 165
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held that the broadcast of the 1982 Rugby League Grand Final,
sponsored by Benson and Hedges "Winfield" brand of cigarettes,
was not a violation of the Act,28 but the broadcast of a ten minute
pre-game dance performance was a violation of the Act.
29
The dance performance in question featured dancers dressed
in the colors of the cigarette packaging, holding a banner display-
ing the brand of cigarette, and dancing to the commonly recog-
nized theme song of the cigarette brand. 30 The court explained
that the Australian Broadcasting Tribunal's ("Tribunal") decision
that the dance performance "was of an advertising character," was a
reasonable conclusion, in light of the fact that the tribunal sepa-
rated the performance from the actual game.3' In concluding that
the broadcast of the rugby match was not a violation of section
tal," pursuant to section 100(10). Id. The court held that the lower tribunal's
decision not to do the latter analysis was not clearly erroneous. See id.
Second, the court relied on a similar reasoning set forth in the Test Cricket
analysis, when it determined that a ballerina's description of the Australian Ballet
program, followed by a display of the Benson and Hedges coat of arms along with
a voice over saying, "proudly sponsored by the Benson and Hedges Company" was
a violation of section 100(5A) of the BTA. Id. 11 25-28. The court noted that
although this advertisement was different, since it was made up mostly of ballet
dancing, Benson and Hedges still violated the BTA by virtue of the statement of
sponsorship. Id. 27.
Third, the court determined that the words, "a Winfield Company Sponsor-
ship" at the beginning and end of an advertisement for a documentary film on
Australia's victory over the United States in the America's Cup, violated section
100(5A) of the BTA. Id. 11 47-48. The court explained, "the use of the name
'Winfield,' whatever it may have done separately for the public image of [the to-
bacco company], turned the attention of viewers to Winfield cigarettes." Id. 1 47.
28. See id. 1 29. During the broadcast of the match, several "large A-frames"
with the words "Anyhow have Winfield 25's" were located around the perimeter of
the field, and the words "Winfield Cup. Making the game bigger." were printed on
one of the A-frames located on the outside of the field and near the middle of the
field. See id. Similar signs were posted on the stands, and a large, cigarette pack-
age-shaped design was painted on the grass behind the goalposts. See id.
29. See id.
30. See Re: The Benson and Hedges Co. (1984), Nos. G172-75, at 1 49 (Fed.
Ct. of Austl., N.S.W. Dist. Registry), affd, Rothmans of Pall Mall, Ltd. v. Australian
Broad. Tribunal (1985) 58 A.L.R. 675. The lower tribunal sought advice from the
television station broadcasting the event, ATN, and the station noted, "Winfield
colours include red & white, blue & white, and green & white - these are also the
colours for three of the teams in the Sydney competition. Tchaikovsky's Fifth Sym-
phony had achieved some significant public acceptance before Winfield sought to
borrow it." Id. 1 29.
31. See id. 1 40. However, the court explained that, since sporting events were
often accompanied by "a degree of razzmatazz," there was a strong argument that,
taking the dance performance and the game as a single sporting event, the per-
formance could fall under an "incidental or accidental" broadcast, pursuant to
section 100(10). See id.
1998]
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100(5A), the court criticized the tribunal's analysis, 32 and deter-
mined that it would "not be possible, or reasonably practical, to tel-
evise the sporting activities without cigarette advertisements being
caught on screen."33
The next major case interpreting the BTAA was not until 1992,
in Action on Smoking and Health, Ltd. v. Australian Broadcasting Tribu-
nal34 In this case, a broadcasting company televised billboards ad-
vertising Marlboro cigarettes located around a race track, and
Marlboro logos on drivers, pit crews and cars at the 1990 Australian
Grand Prix.35 Here, unlike in the dance sequence in Benson and
Hedges, the tribunal reasoned that the broadcast of the Marlboro
advertisements was prohibited by section 100 (5A), but fit within the
exception under section 100(10), since the broadcast of the adver-
tisements was "incidental. '3 6 The court explained that the facts of
Action on Smoking and Health were more similar to the broadcast of
the Rugby match, than to the pre-game dance sequence in Benson
and Hedges.3 7
The next major battle in the war against tobacco advertising
involved legislative action. The Australian Parliament enacted the
Tobacco Advertising Prohibition Act of 1992 (TAPA), which cur-
rently restricts tobacco advertising at sporting events. 38 TAPA was
32. See id. 1 35. The lower tribunal determined that the amount of cigarette
advertising which was broadcast was "substantial," and therefore the entire game
was an advertisement, in violation of the BTA. See id. The proper test to apply was
to first determine if there was an advertisement at all, and then to determine if the
advertisement was incidental. See id. 35-37.
33. Id. 1 38. The court explained that advertising of cigarette products at and
around sporting events was very common. See id. The court acknowledged that it
would be difficult to televise sporting events while completely avoiding the broad-
cast of tobacco sponsorship advertising. See id. However, the court explained that
if a camera "rested on an advertisement for an undue time, or number of times,
the particular screening may not be regarded as an incidental accompaniment."
Id.
34. (1992) 27 A.L.D. 709.
35. See id. 1 7.3.
36. See id. 1 7.2. The Tribunal's policy statement defined "incidental" as "if it
were subordinate to the main matter being transmitted." Id. 1 6.12 (quoting Aus-
tralian Broadcasting Tribunal's Policy Statement issued Dec. 29, 1983, POS 07).
Accordingly, the court reasoned that the Tribunal's decision that the Marlboro
advertisements were permitted by the section 100(10) "incidental" broadcast ex-
ception was not in error. See id. For the relevant text of sections 100(5A) and
100(10), see supra note 21.
37. See Action on Smoking and Health, Ltd. v. Australian Broad. Trib. (1992)
27 A.L.D. 709.
38. See Tobacco Advertising Prohibition Act (TAPA), 1992, § 218 (Austl.)
(amended 1995). Philip Morris, an American tobacco company, suggested it was
considering challenging TAPA on the grounds that the Act "den lies the company]
the normal commercial freedom of speech." Nikki Tait, Philip Morris Acts Against
[Vol. 5: p. 165
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enacted after prior laws governing cigarette advertising in print and
broadcast media became unworkable. 39 The comprehensive law re-
stricts both the broadcasting and publishing of tobacco
advertisements. 40
The major controversy arising from TAPA is the ban on to-
bacco sponsorship at sporting events, which became effective in De-
cember 1995.41 Tobacco companies can, however, escape liability
under the Act if the advertisements are published or broadcast dur-
ing sporting or cultural events of "international significance. '42
Currently, some legislators are trying to eliminate tobacco sponsor-
Australian Ban on Advertising, FIN. TIMES LTD. (Austl.), June 7, 1994, at 20. Philip
Morris decided to sue after the company attempted to publish an advertisement
for the recall of faulty lighters, but was met by opposition when Australian media
groups claimed the advertisement violated federal law. See id. Eventually, the
company modified its advertisement so that it was acceptable to the Australian
audience. See id.
39. See (CTH) Broadcasting Services Act, 1992, tit. 275-2415, at 1 (Austl.).
The purpose underlying TAPA was to provide a "comprehensive legislative frame-
work" to govern the broadcasting industry "into the next century." Id. The Parlia-
ment also acknowledged that broadcasters "should be subject to social and cultural
obligations in accordance with their ability to influence community views." Id. (cit-
ing Statement by Mr. Kim Beazley, Minister for Transport and Communications,
Nov. 7, 1991, commenting on draft of law).
40. See TAPA §§ 13-22.
41. TAPA was amended in 1995, but the amendments did not significantly
affect the Parliamentary prohibition on tobacco sponsorship of sporting events.
TAPA defines a tobacco advertisement as:
[A]ny writing, still or moving picture, sign, symbol or other visual image,
or any audible message, or any combination of 2 or more of those things,
that gives publicity to, or otherwise promotes, or is intended to promote:
(a) smoking; or (b) the purchase or use of ... tobacco products; or...
(f) any other words (for example the whole or a part of a brand name)...
that are closely associated with a tobacco product ....
TAPA § 9(1) (emphasis added).
42. Id. § 18. Whether something is of "international significance" is debata-
ble. For example, the Australian Grand Prix was considered to be an event of
international significance, since without tobacco sponsorship, the motor race
could have been moved to another country. See Amanda Meade, Tobacco Ads - Gov-
ernment Relents for Grand Prix, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Sept. 15, 1994, at 7. The
Australian government was initially divided over whether to permit an exception
for the 500cc Motorcycle Grand Prix. See Danielle Cook, Tobacco Brawl Splits Cabi-
net, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, June 4, 1994, at 1. This dispute arose when the
Minister for Sport, Mr. Downey, accused the Minister for Health, Mr. Phillips, of
jeopardizing efforts to keep the motorcycle race in Australia. See id. Subsequently,
a Labor Health Minister granted the exemption for the Motorcycle Grand Prix.
See Simon Chapman, Greiner Does a Thatcher, 312 Biur. MED. J. 1120 (1996).
The Australian government allowed exemptions for the Bathurst 1000 motor
race and the 1995-96 cricket season. See Michael Sharp, Anti-Smokers Fume over
Sports Exemptions, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, May 10, 1995, at 5. Finally, the Austra-
lian government allowed an exemption for the America's Cup yacht race, but race
officials voiced an objection to the Australian yacht's tobacco sponsorship by Phil-
lip Morris. See Chapman, supra at 1120. See also Alicia Larriera, America's Cup Boat
May Be Smoked Out, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, July 5, 1994, at 1.
19981
9
Longaker: Warning: Your Tobacco Sponsorship May Be Hazardous to Our Nation'
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998
174 VILLANovA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
ship of sporting events entirely. 43 For example, in 1994, Australia's
Minister for Health announced a plan to narrow the "event of inter-
national significance" exception, to eventually completely restrict
any type of tobacco advertisement at any sporting or cultural
event.44 In order to entirely eliminate tobacco sponsorship at sport-
ing events, the Parliament and anti-smoking groups have suggested
using funds from the tax on tobacco products to support the sport-
ing and cultural events. 45
B. Canada
Australia is not alone in its attempts to regulate tobacco spon-
sorship. From 1988 through 1995, the Tobacco Products Control
Act (TPCA) governed Canadian tobacco companies.46 In a 1995
landmark decision, the Canadian Supreme Court held that five sec-
tions of the TPCA, which severely limited tobacco sponsorship,
were unconstitutional. 47 Tobacco giants R.J.R. MacDonald and Im-
In contrast, the World Series Cricket Tournament was not considered an
event of international significance. See Australia Stumps Tobacco Ads, FIN. TIMES
(London), Jan. 3, 1997, at 4. During the World Series, to comply with Australian
law, the Pakistan team was forced to remove stickers bearing the name of their
sponsor, a Pakistani corporation which sells cigarettes and cricket equipment,
from their bats. See id.
43. See, e.g., Amanda Meade, Lawrence Firm on Sport Tobacco Ads, SYDNEY MORN-
ING HERALD, June 2, 1994, at 2 (explaining Australian Minister for Health wants to
"further diminish the opportunity for exemptions" to TAPA).
A survey in Australia in 1994 revealed that two out of three people believed
cigarette companies should be allowed to provide funds to sporting events. See
Alicia Larriera, Smoking in Restaurants Gets Flick, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, July 9,
1994, at 3. The survey revealed that, of the men surveyed, 65% believed tobacco
sponsorship should be allowed, 31% believed it should not be allowed, and 4%
were unsure. See id. The women's results were similar: 58% believed tobacco spon-
sorship should be allowed, 36% believed it should not be allowed, and 6% were
unsure. See id.
44. See Larriera, supra note 43, at 3.
45. See Peter Deeley & lain Macleod, DAILY TELEGRAPH (Austl.), Dec. 7, 1990,
at 32. In 1990, the Health Promotion Foundation held ten percent of annual to-
bacco taxes with the intent to buy out tobacco sponsorship in sports. See id.
46. See Tobacco Products Control Act (TPCA), R.S.C., ch. 20, §§ 35-37 (1988)
(Can.). The purpose of the TPCA is to "prohibit the advertising and promotion
and . . . labeling and monitoring of tobacco products." Id. The TPCA has been
termed "one of the world's toughest anti-smoking laws." See Bernard Simpson, Ot-
tawa Fans Tobacco Advertising Flames, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 26, 1996, at 8.
47. See R.J.R.-MacDonald v. Attorney General of Canada [1995] 127 D.L.R.4th
1. The provisions in question in RJ.R.-MacDonald were sections four, five, six,
eight and nine of the TPCA. Section four provides, "[n]o person shall advertise
any tobacco product offered for sale in Canada." TPCA, R.S.C., ch. 20, § 4 (1988)
(Can.). Section five provides that, "Notwithstanding section 4, a retailer may...
expose tobacco products for sale at the retailer's place of business .... " Id. § 5.
Section six provides:
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perial Tobacco, Ltd.4 8 filed a lawsuit and challenged the TPCA on
the basis that (1) this type of legislation was reserved to the prov-
inces of Canada, not the federal Parliament; and (2) the TPCA in-
fringed upon the companies' freedom of expression and right to
advertise established in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms.49 The Supreme Court agreed with the tobacco companies
on both issues, and overturned the unconstitutional sections of the
TPCA.50
Since these sections of the TPCA were overturned, Canada has
struggled to come up with effective yet legal legislation, without
eliminating cultural and sporting events. 5 1 Originally, many be-
lieved the Canadian Minister of Health would propose to com-
pletely ban tobacco sponsorship of sporting events; however, in
the name of a manufacturer or importer of tobacco products ... may be
used, otherwise than in association with a tobacco product, in a represen-
tation to the public (a) that promotes a cultural or sporting activity or
event; or (b) that acknowledges... contributions made by the manufac-
turer ... of the tobacco product toward such activity ....
Id. § 6. To circumvent section six, many tobacco companies established subsidiary
companies with the name of a popular cigarette brand as the name of the subsidi-
ary. See Gary M. Gillman and Ronald Chapman, Tobacco and Human Rights, 146
NEw L.J. 1232 (1996). Section eight provides that, "[n]o manufacturer or im-
porter of tobacco products . . . shall (a) apply the trade mark . . . to any article
other than a tobacco product or a package or container in which a tobacco prod-
uct is sold or shipped.... ." TPCA, R.S.C., ch. 20, § 8 (1988) (Can.). Section nine
prohibits distribution of tobacco products that have not been affixed with a health
warning. Id. § 9.
In holding that the provisions of the TPCA were unconstitutional, the
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. See R.J.R.-MacDon-
ald v. Attorney General of Canada [1995] 127 D.L.R.4th 1. The Supreme Court's
decision did, however, determine that the Parliament had the power to enact the
law based on the Parliament's power to enact criminal laws. See id. For a detailed
discussion of the history of the case at the trial and appellate stages, see MacDon-
ald, Inc. v. Canada (AG): Reflections from the Perspective of Health, 40 McGiLL L.J. 229-
77 (1995).
48. Currently, Imperial Tobacco Ltd. controls approximately 65% of the to-
bacco market in Canada. See Mark MacKinnon, Canada Tobacco Industry to Fight
Anti-Tobacco Bil RxuTERs FIN. SERV., Dec. 3, 1996, at Canadian Financial Report
Sec.
49. See RJ.R. MacDonald, 127 D.L.R.4th at 1. The Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms § 2(b) provides, in pertinent part, "[e]veryone has the following
fundamental freedoms . . . freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression,
including freedom of the press and other media of communication." Fundamen-
tal Freedoms Constitution Act, C.R.C., ch. 11, § 2(b) (1982) (Can.). For a detailed
discussion of the argument in favor of the TPCA, see Rob Cunningham, Note,
Cigarette Advertising and Freedom of Expression: The Case for the Tobacco Products Control
Act, 48 U. ToRoNro FAc. L. Rxv. 304, 309 (1990).
50. See RJR. MacDonald, 127 D.L.R.4th at 1.
51. See, e.g., Government Set to Railroad Anti-Sponsorship Bill Through Parliament,
CAN. NEws WIE, Dec. 3, 1996, at 30 (explaining implications on and reaction of
cultural community if proposed legislation limiting tobacco sponsorship is
passed).
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response to pressure from the cultural and sporting communities,
the proposed legislation, known as Bill C-71, allowed tobacco com-
panies to use their corporate names in connection with events. 52
The Canadian Senate recently passed the bill, now known as the
Tobacco Act.53 This Act has not been entirely well received.5 4
Until the Tobacco Act, the Tobacco Industry Voluntary Pack-
aging and Advertising Code of the Canadian Tobacco Manufactur-
52. See Anthony Wilson-Smith, Trying to Snuff Out Smoking, MACLEAN'S (Can.),
Dec. 9, 1996, at 24 (explaining proposed legislation "fall[s] short of the total ban
on sponsorship that was widely expected."). The proposed legislation required
that (1) any advertisements for the sporting events only list the time and place of
the events; and (2) tobacco companies' names on print advertising material for the
sporting events could not occupy greater than 10% of the advertising space. See id.
The proposed law also banned all print advertising for tobacco products, except in
print material primarily for adults. See id.
53. See Tobacco Act, S.C., ch. 13, §§ 1-66 (1997) (Can.). Section 24 of the
Tobacco Act specifically addresses the tobacco sponsorship of events, and provides
in pertinent part, "[a] person may display a tobacco product-related brand ele-
ment only within the bottom ten percent of the display surface of any promotional
material." Id. § 24. The Act defines a "brand element" as including, "a brand
name, trade-mark, trade-name, distinguishing guise, logo, graphic arrangement,
design or slogan that is reasonably associated with, or that evokes, a product, a
service or a brand of product or service, but does not include a colour." Id. § 2.
Both the tobacco industry and numerous arts and cultural groups lobbied
against the bill, for fear that events such as the Grand Prix and the Jazz Festival
would not be able to continue without tobacco sponsorship money. See Tide Is
Turning Against Tobacco, MoNTREAL GAZETrE, April 21, 1997, at B2. In response to
this pressure, the government allowed extra time before the implementation of
the rules so that the events could find new sponsors. See id. The effective date of
the sponsorship provision of the Tobacco Act is October 1, 1998. See Tobacco Act,
S.C., ch. 13, § 24 (1997) (Can.).
54. See William Johnson, Tobacco Legislation Is Authoritarian and Opportunistic,
FIN. POST (Can.), April 4, 1997, at 13. To pass Supreme Court scrutiny, the govern-
ment must prove the law is "demonstrably justified." Id. Whether the law is "de-
monstrably justified" depends on which report one believes. Based on a report
from Health Canada, smoking in Canada declined from 38% in 1981 to 31% in
1994. See id. This same report continues, "but there has been no real change [in
smoking rates] since 1986 (32%)." Id. Some Canadians believe the Supreme
Court will also strike down Bill C-71, as it struck down TAPA, because the bill
violates Canadians' right to free speech. See id.
The tobacco industry has already vowed to challenge the new law in court. See
Stephen Barrington, Canada's Latest Cigarette Marketing Regs Under Fire: Limits on
Motorsport Sponsors Are Already Running Out of Gas, ADVERTISING AGE, Apr. 21, 1997,
at 62. The tobacco industry is arguing that the law is still too vague to interpret,
making it "impossible to advertise anything." Id.
Further, one day after the Senate approved the law, the Canadian government
was already considering amendments. See id. For example, the new law bans to-
bacco imagery in motorsports, on cars, equipment and team clothes. See id. How-
ever, the Canadian government promised to loosen the rules for motor sports by
late 1997. See id.; see also Amy Rosewater, CART Winning Tobacco Battle in Canada,
PLAIN DEALER, April 23, 1997, at 5D (CART threatened to pull its motor races out
of Canada if Bill C-71 was passed without motor sports exemption).
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ers' Council ("Code") governed tobacco sponsorship. 55 The Code
provided less stringent restrictions on tobacco sponsorship of sport-
ing events than the TPCA provided.56 From the foregoing discus-
sion of Canada's attempts to regulate tobacco sponsorship, it is
clear that the future of Canadian tobacco sponsorship is
uncertain.5 7
55. The Tobacco Industry Voluntary Packaging and Advertising Code of the
Canadian Tobacco Manufacturers' Council (Nov. 1, 1996) [hereinafter Voluntary
Code], copy of Code from Canadian Tobacco Manufacturers' Council to Author
(on file with the Villanova Sports and Entertainment Law Journal). Prior to the Parlia-
ment's enactment of TAPA, the country regulated tobacco advertisements through
voluntary codes, in agreement with tobacco companies. See Gary M. Gillman and
Ronald Chapman, Tobacco and Human Rights, 146 NEw L.J. 1232 (1996). The vol-
untary codes provided that, in the event of a dispute, the controversy would be
solved privately through arbitration. See id.
56. Section four of the Code addressed tobacco sponsorship of sporting
events, and provided:
4.1 No sponsorship advertising may depict any tobacco product or any
package commonly associated with a tobacco product or any tobacco-re-
lated good;
4.2 Sponsorship advertising may contain the full corporate name of any
manufacturer of tobacco products and may contain a tobacco trade-mark
under the condition imposed by article 4.3;
4.3 It is permissible to use a tobacco trade-mark in sponsorship advertis-
ing if it is used in association with a sponsored event, events or activity.
The principal purpose of sponsorship advertising which incorporates a
tobacco trade-mark must be the promotion of the event, events or activ-
ity, which must be identified by text. A secondary purpose may be the
development of goodwill toward a tobacco trade-mark, the owner and/or
authorized user(s) of the tobacco trade-mark, derived from the associa-
tion of the tobacco trade-mark with the event, events or activity.
4.4 Outdoor sponsorship advertisements purchased by a manufacturer
or under the manufacturer's authority shall not be placed within 200 me-
tres of the perimeter of any primary or secondary school property.
4.5 Sponsorship advertising placed directly, or as authorized by, a manu-
facturer in print or broadcast media shall be confined to print publica-
tions or broadcast programs with a predominantly adult audience, as the
case may be.
For clarification purposes, the broadcasting, live or delayed, of a spon-
sored event, in whole or in part, shall be deemed not to be sponsorship
advertising under the Code.
4.6 All models or actors paid to appear in sponsorship advertisements
shall be adults 25 years of age or older. This provision does not apply to
photographs or representations of actual participants or performers in
the sponsored event or activity who appear in sponsorship advertising for
the event or activity.
Voluntary Code, supra note 55, at 1.
57. Many tobacco organizations are skeptical about whether a new, tougher
law will survive the scrutiny of the Canadian Supreme Court. See Bernard Simpson,
Ottowa Fans Tobacco Advertising Flames, FIN. TIMEs (London), Nov. 26, 1996, at 8; see
also Canada Tobacco Industry to Fight Anti-Tobacco Bil, REuTERs FIN. SERV., Dec. 3,
1996, at 1 (quoting Rob Parker, president of Canadian Tobacco Manufacturers'
Council, stating "[t]he [proposed tobacco bill] in its present form, is contemptu-
ous of the Supreme Court.").
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C. United States
Tobacco advertising on television has been prohibited in the
United States since 1971, pursuant to the Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act (CLAA).58 Congress has twice failed at banning to-
bacco sponsorship of sporting events: the Tobacco Control and
Health Protection Act (TCHPA) 59 and the Protect Our Children
from Cigarettes Act (POCCA).6o Both Acts were strongly opposed
by supporters who believed the laws violated the First
Amendment.61
In 1980, the United States Supreme Court established a four-
pronged test to determine if a governmental regulation is a viola-
tion of commercial free speech. In Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission,62 the Supreme Court held that the
following four factors must be considered when determining
whether a regulation is a violation of the First Amendment: 1) the
advertisement must contain lawful information which is not mis-
leading; 2) the government must have a substantial interest in the
58. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-41 (1994). The language of § 1335, which expressly
prohibits the broadcast of tobacco advertisements, reads, " [a ffter January 1, 1971,
it shall be unlawful to advertise cigarettes and little cigars on any medium of elec-
tronic communication subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Communications
Commission." Id. § 1335.
59. H.R. 5041, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). The bill was introduced by Rep.
Henry Waxman, a Democrat from California, and was ultimately supported by
thirty co-sponsors. See Randall H. Stoner, Note, 200 MPH Cigarette Ads: A Compari-
son of International Restrictions on Tobacco Sports Sponsorship, 15 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 639, 648 (1992).
60. H.R. 1250, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), reprinted in Tobacco Issues (Part 1):
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Transp. and Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). POCCA was introduced by Rep.
Thomas Luken, a Democrat from Ohio. See Stoner, supra note 59, at 649.
61. See Stoner, supra note 59, at 649-50. The TCHPA provided in pertinent
part:
It shall be unlawful within the United States for the manufacturer, pack-
ager, or distributor of tobacco products . . . to sponsor or cause to be
sponsored any athletic, music, artistic, or other event in the name of a
tobacco product trademark or in a manner so that a tobacco product
trademark is publicly identified as a sponsor of... such an event... [or]
to pay or cause to be paid to have any tobacco product trademark appear
on any vehicle, boat, or any other equipment used in sports.
Id. at 648 (quoting H.R. 5041, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 6(b)(2), (5) (1990)).
Similarly, the POCCA prohibited "displaying the registered brand name or
logo of a tobacco product on cars, boats, animals, or other sporting equipment...
unless the brand name is the name of a corporation in existence on August 1,
1988." Id. at 649 (quoting H.R. 1250, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(b) (2) (F) (1989)).
POCCA also prohibited billboards or signs advertising tobacco products to be "lo-
cated in a sports stadium or other sports facility." Id. (quoting H.R. 1250, supra
§ 3(a) (2) (A)).
62. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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field in which it is regulating; 3) the regulation must advance the
government's interest; and 4) the regulation must be narrowly
drafted.63
In attempting to comply with the Central Hudson test, the FDA
enacted regulations in mid-1996 prohibiting the sponsorship of
sporting events by the brand name of a tobacco product, but not by
the name of the tobacco company itself.64 The purpose underlying
the FDA regulations was to limit children's exposure to tobacco
products, and to reduce the "positive imagery" which makes to-
bacco products appealing to the younger generation. 65
63. See id. at 566. In Central Hudson, the New York Public Service Commission,
in an effort to limit fuel consumption in light of an impending fuel shortage, pro-
hibited promotional advertising by an electrical company. Id. at 558-59. The Cen-
tral Hudson Court struck down the Commission's advertising prohibition, since it
infringed upon the electric company's First Amendment right to commercial free
speech. Id. at 572.
64. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and
Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396,
44,617-18 (Aug. 28, 1996) [hereinafter Regulations]. The language of the regula-
tions provide in pertinent part:
No manufacturer, distributor, or retailer may sponsor or cause to be
sponsored any athletic, musical, artistic, or other social or cultural event,
or any entry or team in any event, in the brand name (alone or in con-
junction with any other word), logo, symbol, motto, selling message, rec-
ognizable color or pattern of colors, or any other indicia of product
identification identical or similar to... those used for any brand of ciga-
rettes or smokeless tobacco. Nothing in this paragraph prevents a manu-
facturer, distributor, or retailer from sponsoring or causing to be
sponsored any athletic, musical, artistic, or other social or cultural event,
or team or entry in the name of the corporation which manufactures the
tobacco product, provided that.., the corporate name does not include
any brand name (alone or in conjunction with any other word), logo,
symbol, motto, selling message, recognizable color or pattern of colors,
or any other indicia of product identification identical or similar to, or
identifiable with, those used for any brand of cigarettes or smokeless
tobacco.
Id. at 44,618. This regulation became effective on February 28, 1998. See id. at
44,396. Other provisions of the FDA regulation provide that (1) tobacco advertis-
ing in magazines which target readers under 18 years of age would be restricted by
only allowing advertisers to publish ads in black and white with text only; (2) all
cigarette vending machines would be prohibited, except those located in clubs in
which only adults may enter; (3) no tobacco billboards would be permitted within
1000 feet of schools, and (4) all billboards for tobacco products would be re-
stricted to black-and-white text only. See Shankar Vedantam, Battle Set to Begin Over
Tobacco Rules, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 9, 1997, at A8.
In August 1995, President Bill Clinton directed the FDA to enact the regula-
tions limiting exposure of children to tobacco products. See Clinton "Will Allow FDA
to Regulate Tobacco as a Drug", EXTEL EXAMINER, Aug. 10, 1995, at 2. The FDA also
supported its jurisdiction over tobacco by issuing a 250 page proposal outlining its
contention that tobacco is a drug. See id.
65. See Regulations, supra note 64, at 44,396.
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Immediately following President Bill Clinton's announcement
that he would allow the FDA to regulate the tobacco industry, the
tobacco industry filed a lawsuit in a North Carolina federal court
challenging validity of the FDA's regulations. 66 The tobacco indus-
try claimed that the FDA's restrictions on tobacco advertising were
unconstitutional because (1) the FDA did not have the authority to
enact the regulations, 67 and (2) the regulations violated the First
Amendment.68 Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA sparked the beginning of
the controversy. 69
The tobacco industry sought summary judgment.70 The court
granted summary judgment in favor of the tobacco industry on the
basis that the FDA had no authority to restrict the promotion and
advertising of tobacco products. 71 It denied summary judgment on
the basis that the FDA had the authority to regulate access restric-
tions and labeling requirements on tobacco products. 72
66. See Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA, 958 F. Supp. 1060 (M.D.N.C. 1997). Adver-
tising companies and convenience stores were also a part of the lawsuit challeng-
ing the FDA regulations. See id.
The Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, a group supporting the FDA regula-
tions, asserted, "[e]ven the [tobacco] industry does not argue it has a First Amend-
ment right to advertise to children .... This is an issue of line-drawing. The
[tobacco] industry argues the lines are improperly drawn. We and the FDA argue
that the lines are reasonably drawn." Shanker Vedantam, Battle Set to Begin Over
Tobacco Rules, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 9, 1997, at A8 (quoting Matthew Myers, lawyer
for Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids).
67. See Coyne Beahm, 958 F. Supp. at 1065.
68. See Coyne Beahm, No. 2:95CV00591, 1997 U.S. Dist. Lexis 5453, at *88-*91
(M.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 1997) (attachment explaining procedural history of litigation
and plaintiffs summary of case).
69. For a thorough discussion of the two sides of the tobacco sponsorship
debate, see CharlesJ. Harder, Comment, Is It Curtains forJoe Camel? A Critical Anal-
ysis of the 1995 FDA Proposed Rule to Restrict Tobacco Advertising, Promotion and Sales to
Protect Children and Adolescents, 16 Loy. L.A. ENr. L.J. 399 (1995); Lars Noah and
Barbara A. Noah, Nicotine Withdrawal: Assessing the FDA's Effort to Regulate Tobacco
Products, 48 ALA. L. REv. 1 (1996); Paul J. Weber and Greg Marks, Debate on the
Constitutionality and Desirability of a Tobacco-Products Advertising Ban, 15 N. Ky. L. REv.
57 (1988). For an argument opposing the constitutionality of the FDA's regula-
tions, see Mark R. Ludwikowski, Comment, Proposed Government Regulation of Tobacco
Advertising Uses Teens to Disguise First Amendment Violations, 4 CoMMLAw CONSPECrUS
105 (1996).
70. See Coyne Beahm, 958 F. Supp. at 1065. The FDA did not formally move for
summary judgement, but suggested this remedy in its reply brief. See id. at 1065
n.1.
71. See id. at 1086.
72. See id. The court also ordered that the FDA regulations regarding tobacco
products remain in full effect, pending an appeal by the plaintiffs. See id.
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1. FDA's Authority to Regulate Tobacco Industry
The tobacco industry's argument that the FDA did not have
the power to regulate tobacco advertising rested upon two theories:
(1) Congress has never given the FDA the power to regulate the
tobacco industry, 73 and (2) tobacco is not a "drug" or "device," sub-
ject to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 74 over which the
FDA has authority.75
The FDA, however, asserted that it did have jurisdiction pursu-
ant to the FDCA, since tobacco products are "combination prod-
ucts" 76 with a drug component of nicotine, and device components
intended to deliver nicotine to a person's body.77 The FDA also
73. See id. at 1065.
74. See id.; see also 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395 (1994). Section 32 1(g)(1) of the
FDCA defines a "drug" as:
(A) articles recognized in the official United States Pharmacopoeia ...
(B) articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment,
or prevention of disease in man or other animals; and (C) articles (other
than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of
man or other animals; and (D) articles intended for use as a component
of any article specified in clause (A), (B), or (C).
Id. § 321(g)(1). Further, § 321(h) of the FDCA defines a "device" as:
[A]n instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant,
in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article, including any compo-
nent, part, or accessory, which is...
(2) intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions,
or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease... or
(3) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of
man . .. and
which does not achieve its primary intended purposes through chemical
action within or on the body of man or other animals which is not depen-
dent upon being metabolized for the achievement of its primary in-
tended purposes.
Id. § 321(h).
In the FDCA, Congress granted the FDA the authority to regulate "drugs" or
"devices" which are "intended to affect a structure or any function of the body." 21
U.S.C. §§ 321(g)(1), (h). Here, the tobacco industry contended that this defini-
tion did not apply to tobacco products, since the tobacco company did not "'in-
tend to affect' a structure or function of the body" by producing and distributing
cigarettes. See Coyne Beahm, 958 F. Supp. at 1065-68. To support this argument, the
tobacco industry relied on the legislative history of the FDCA, which provides that
"a manufacturer's representations in marketing a product would determine its in-
tended use." See id.
75. See Coyne Beahm, 958 F. Supp. at 1074.
76. Id. at 1079. The FDA defines a "combination product" as, "[a] product
comprised of two or more regulated components, i.e., drug/device .... that are
physically, chemically, or otherwise combined or mixed and produced as a single
entity." Id. at 1080 n.16 (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 3.2(e) (1995)). Some examples of
products which satisfy the FDA's definition of combination products include pre-
filled syringes, metered dose inhalers, nicotine patches and intravenous infusion
pumps. See id. (citing 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 45,211 (Aug. 28, 1996).
77. See id. at 1079-81.
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contended it had broad authority in deciding whether to regulate
products which are a combination of "drugs" and "devices. '78 Fi-
nally, relying on Central Hudson, the FDA asserted that it was not
required to use the "least restrictive" regulations to accomplish its
goals, but rather, it could use the "reasonable fit" test, provided the
regulations were narrowly tailored. 79
2. The First Amendment
In Coyne Beahm, the tobacco industry asserted that the final
prong of the Central Hudson test, whether the regulations were nar-
rowly drafted so as not to violate the First Amendment, was at is-
sue.80 In response to the tobacco industry's allegations, the FDA
argued that the restrictions did not violate the First Amendment
since they were narrowly drafted and did not prohibit all forms of
tobacco advertising. 81
The Coyne Beahm court resolved the dispute by relying on the
plain language of the statute in question. Section 360j(e) of the
FDCA allows the FDA to restrict the "sale" of certain devices. 82 The
court reasoned that the term "sale"83 does not include the advertis-
ing or promotion of a product. 84 Accordingly, the court held that
78. See id. at 1074-79.
79. See Gail Appleson, Lawyers Say Proposed Tobacco Rules Limit Speech, REUTERS
FIN. SERV., Dec. 26, 1996, at Financial Report Sec.
80. See Coyne Beahm, No. 2:95CV00591, 1997 U.S. Dist. Lexis 5453, at *100
(M.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 1997) (attachment explaining procedural history of litigation
and plaintiffs summary of case).
81. See Gail Appleson, Lawyers Say Proposed Tobacco Rules Limit Speech, REUTERS
FIN. SERV., Dec. 26, 1996, at Financial Report Sec. William Schultz, FDA's Deputy
Commissioner for Policy, argued that limiting children's access to cigarettes is in-
sufficient. See id. Rather, he submitted, the FDA must address consumers' appeal
to cigarettes created by cigarette advertising. See id.
82. 21 U.S.C. § 360j(e) (1994). Section 360j(e) provides in pertinent part,
"The Secretary may by regulation require that a device be restricted to sale, distri-
bution, or use . . .upon such other conditions as the Secretary may prescribe in
such regulation, if, because of its potentiality for harmful effect ... there cannot
otherwise be reasonable assurance of its safety and effectiveness." Id.
83. The court looked to the American Heritage Dictionary which defined a
"sale" as:
1. The exchange of goods or services for an amount of money or its
equivalent; the act of selling. 2. An instance of selling property. 3. An
opportunity for selling or being sold; demand. 4. Availability for
purchase; a store where pets are for sale.
5. A selling of property to the highest bidder; auction. 6. A special dis-
posal of goods at lowered prices; coats on sale this week. 7. sales. a. Activities
involved in the selling of goods or services. b. Gross receipts.
Coyne Beahm, 958 F. Supp. at 1084 n.23 (citing THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICrIoN-
ARY 1085 (2d ed. 1991)) (emphasis in original).
84. See id. at 1084. The court further supported its view by recognizing that
Congress expressly used the terms "offer for sale," "advertising," and "advertise-
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the FDA could not regulate the tobacco industry's promotion of its
products. 85 Importantly, the court noted that it was not required to
delve into the First Amendment issue, since it already held that the
FDA lacked the authority under the FDCA to restrict the advertising
and promotion of tobacco products.8 6
Along with the Coyne Beahm decision, recent developments
have begun to shape the future of the tobacco industry's sponsor-
ship of sporting events in the United States. First, the Liggett
Group, one of the largest international tobacco companies, admit-
ted that it knew of the dangers of using tobacco products, which it
had previously denied.87 Second, the tobacco industry agreed to a
$368.5 billion settlement with forty states which had initiated
lawsuits alleging negligence on the part of the tobacco compa-
nies.88 The settlement, among other things, provides that the to-
bacco industry will not be allowed to sponsor sporting events.89
ments" in other sections of the FDCA. See id. See also 21 U.S.C. §§ 321 (n), 331 (1),
331(m), 331(n), 331(o), 352(n), 352(q) and 353(c).
85. See Coyne Beahm, 958 F. Supp. at 1086.
86. See id. at 1086 n.33. For a general discussion of the FDA's regulation of
tobacco advertising and sponsorship, see Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., FDA Regulation
of Tobacco Advertising and Youth Smoking: Historical Social, and Constitutional Perspec-
tives, 277 JAMA 410, 410 (Feb. 5, 1997).
87. See Interview by Charles Gibson with Bennett LeBow, Owner, Liggett
Group (ABC Good Morning America television broadcast) (July 23, 1997). In a
trial involving airline attendants' exposure to second-hand smoke, Bennett LeBow
admitted that based on his own knowledge, reports he read and his personal feel-
ings, he felt that, despite the tobacco industry's previous denial, smoking causes
lung cancer, heart disease and emphysema. See id.
88. For a discussion of the events leading up to the tobacco settlement, see
generally, The News Hour With Jim Lehrer, (MacNeil/Lehrer Productions, June 20,
1997). Michael Moore, Mississippi's Attorney General, was the legal negotiator of
the settlement. See Mark Curriden, The Great Tobacco Deal, 83 ABA JouRNAL 20
(Aug. 1997). After approximately 90 days of negotiations, the parties reached the
settlement on June 20, 1997. See id. at 20.
89. See generally Curriden, supra note 88, at 20-21. First, the agreement settles
pending lawsuits against the tobacco companies and prohibits future class action
negligence lawsuits brought by consumers. See id. at 21. Second, it provides to-
bacco companies immunity from punitive damages; however, there would be no
limit on compensatory damages. See id. Third, the settlement provides the to-
bacco industry with a $5 billion annual cap on damages it would have to pay for
lawsuits. See id. Fourth, it gives the FDA the authority to regulate tobacco prod-
ucts, provided that the FDA does not ban nicotine until 2009. See id. Fifth, by
agreeing to the settlement, the tobacco companies agreed to reduce teenage
smoking by 67% over the next 10 years, otherwise they would be subject to a $2
billion per year penalty. See id. Sixth, tobacco companies would be required to
turn over internal documents to a panel of judges, which would then release the
non-privileged documents to the public. See id. Finally, tobacco companies would
have to agree that nicotine is addictive and that smoking causes cancer. See id.
For an in-depth discussion of the details of the proposed tobacco settlement,
see Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee (Tobacco Settlement Review), FED. NEWS
SERV., July 16, 1997.
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In early 1998, the settlement was pending approval from
Congress. 90
D. France
Like Australia, Canada and the United States, the French gov-
ernment has also taken measures to eliminate tobacco advertising
and sponsorship at sporting events. In 1991, France passed the con-
troversial Loi Evin, a law which gradually phased out all advertising
of tobacco products and sponsorship of sporting events by tobacco
companies. 91 This law triggered a controversial chain of events in
the French sporting world.
First, a French auto racing team was sanctioned by a French
court for advertising tobacco products during the 1992 Australian
Grand Prix.92 The Loi Evin banned all advertising of tobacco prod-
ucts, which included foreign advertisements broadcast in France.9 3
The Cannon decision resulted in the Cannon Williams Renault auto
racing team risking seizure of their cars and equipment if they trav-
eled through or into France.9 4
Second, after the Cannon decision, the French Grand Prix was
canceled because the president of the French Motor Sports Federa-
tion could not guarantee that foreign teams sponsored by tobacco
companies would not have their cars and equipment seized by the
French government.95 Because of this lack of guarantee, the Inter-
90. See Curriden, supra note 88, at 20.
91. See Law No. 91-32 ofJan. 10, 1991,J.O.,Jan. 12, 1991, p. 615. The law also
restricts alcohol advertisements, imposes a 15% tax on tobacco products and dis-
courages smoking in public places. See Sarah Lambert, France Bids Au Revoir to All
That: Cigarette and Alcohol Advertising Face the Guillotine, INDEP., July 1, 1990, at 13.
Interestingly, the French Health Education Committee released a report indi-
cating that prior to the enactment of the Loi Evin, smoking rates among teenagers
were declining. See Tobacco Lobby Steps Up Fight to Keep Ads, MARKETING WK, June 12,
1997, at 9. The report noted that from the time the Loi Evin was enacted in 1991,
until 1996, the smoking rate among French youth increased from 30.5% to 34%.
See id.
92. See Alan Fraser, Williams Dilemma, DAILY MAIL, Dec. 10, 1992, at 61. The
racers displayed Camel logos on their cars while they were competing in foreign
races that were broadcast in France. See id. For a discussion of the restrictions
surrounding the broadcast of tobacco advertisements during the 1992 Australian
Grand Prix, see supra notes 20-45, and accompanying text.
93. See Law No. 91-32 of Jan. 10, 1991, J.O., Jan. 12, 1991, p. 615; see also
Timothy Collings, Motor Racing: Court Ruling May Choke GP Circuit, DAILY TELE-
GRAPH, Dec. 10, 1992, at 31.
This restriction excludes the broadcast of all 16 international grands prix on
French television. See id.
94. See Collings, supra note 93, at 31.
95. See id. Several French politicians sought to amend the law to allow to-
bacco advertising at motor sports events, so that the Grand Prix would not be can-
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national Motor Sports Federation attempted to secure an alterna-
tive location for the French Grand Prix in Germany. 96 To keep the
Grand Prix in France, however, the French government adopted an
amendment to the Loi Evin, which provided that sports that were
"heavily dependent" on support from tobacco companies would not
be penalized for displaying tobacco advertisements. 97 Subse-
quently, the hefty fine imposed on the Cannon Williams Renault
racing team was withdrawn. 98
III. ANALYSIS
As Part II indicates, several countries are struggling with the
tobacco industry to create laws which limit the public's, particularly
children's, exposure to tobacco advertising. This section analyzes
the arguments advanced by the tobacco industry against banning
tobacco sponsorship at sporting events, and the nations' responses
to these arguments.
A. Tobacco Industry Argument #1: Alternative, Less Restrictive
Means to Promote the Health of a Nation Can Accomplish Goal
of Limited Exposure of Tobacco Advertising to Children.
Tobacco companies argue that drastic measures, such as total
bans on tobacco advertising, are too extreme. Some opponents of
total bans on tobacco advertising argue that such drastic legislation
was imposed to sway public opinion in favor of particular political
candidates. 99 Instead, through alternative, less restrictive measures,
celed. See id. The French National Assembly, however, voted 319 to 129 against
the amendment. See id. The 1993 French Motorcycling Grand Prix was canceled
for the same reason. See Smokers May Pay for Lost Sponsors, DAILY MAIL, Dec. 17,
1992, at 58.
96. See Timothy Collings, Motor Racing: Nurburgring Set to Stage French GP, DAILY
TELEGRAPH, Dec. 11, 1992, at 34. In order to secure a new location for the grand
prix, the French Motor Sports Federation would have to first request that the race
take place outside of the country. See id.
97. See French U-Turn on Grand Prix, AssoCLArTED NEWSPAPERS, Dec. 20, 1992, at
93.
98. See id. The French court originally imposed a fine of four million francs.
See id.
99. See Tom O'Sullivan, Kicking Butt, MARKETING WK, Sept. 6, 1996, at 41-43.
For example, in the United States, President Bill Clinton authorized the FDA's
regulation of tobacco products on the verge of an election year, knowing that he
would be unable to win the votes of southern, tobacco-producing states, but hop-
ing to win support from undecided voters with his concern for the health of the
nation's children. See id. ("What Clinton has done is very political. He could have
made this announcement any time in the past 12 months. But he waited until the
eve of the Democratic convention."). See also Attacks on Clinton's Anti-Smoking Meas-
ures Mount (CNN television broadcast, Aug. 23, 1996) (statement of Hal Shoup,
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nations can educate their youth about the dangers of tobacco ad-
diction, while at the same time preserving the rights of those who
manufacture, sell, market and use tobacco products. Examples of
less restrictive measures include providing counter-advertising, 100
raising smokers' insurance premiums,101 and allowing text-only ad-
vertising and sponsorships. 10 2
First, tobacco companies argue that countries could develop
counter-advertising measures to reduce the risk of exposing chil-
dren to tobacco. "Counter-advertising" consists of "running anti-
smoking advertisements to counter the effect of cigarette advertise-
ments."103 For example, in England, the Cancer Research Cam-
paign decided to sponsor a motor racing car known as the "Stop
before you Start" car.104 Those who oppose tobacco sponsorship
argue that active counter-advertising measures would send the
message to youths that smoking is not glamorous. 10 5 Tobacco com-
panies have not expressly rejected this alternative, although
counter-advertising could cause the companies to lose profits from
tobacco sales.10 6
from American Association of Advertising Agencies) ("[The FDA regulations]
make good headlines but they make lousy policy").
Similarly, in Canada, the former Health Minister David Dingwall's attempt to
pass new legislation prohibiting tobacco sponsorship, has called, "the last great
legislative battle of 1996." John DeMont, Tobacco's Top Guns, MAcL-AN's, Nov. 18,
1996, at 18. "[The] hard truth becomes as elusive as a wisp of smoke when politics,
moral conviction and big money intersect." Id. Dingwall was defeated by a health-
care worker and NDP candidate, Michelle Dockrill, in the 1997 Canadian election.
See Victors and Vanquished, MACLEAN'S, June 9, 1997, at 20.
100. For a discussion of counter-advertising methods, see infra notes 103-06
and accompanying text.
101. For a discussion of raising insurance premiums, see infra notes 107-08
and accompanying text.
102. For a discussion of text-only advertising, see infra notes 109-11 and ac-
companying text.
103. Stoner, supra note 59, at 666. Counter-advertising first began when the
Federal Communications Commission required television stations to provide free
broadcast segments to anti-smoking campaigns to counter the effects of cigarette
advertising, pursuant to the "fairness doctrine." Id. The fairness doctrine was orig-
inally established to give equal air time to both sides of controversial issues, but the
doctrine was abolished in 1989. See id. at 666 n.224. For the case abolishing the
fairness doctrine, see Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
104. Bill Caven, Charity Takes on Tobacco Firms at the Race Track, THE HERALD
(Glasgow), July 8, 1994, at 6. The Cancer Research Campaign wanted to "take the
tobacco industry on 'at its own game.'" Id. The charity received support from
numerous sports personalities, including racer Stirling Moss. See id.
105. See Stoner, supra note 59, at 666-68.
106. See id. at 667. For example, in 1992, Marlboro agreed to devote 30% of
its advertising to counter-advertising measures during its promotion of the New
York Marlboro Grand Prix Indy Race. See id. at 667 n.233.
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Second, tobacco companies argue that countries could raise
the insurance premiums of smokers. One of the major complaints
by government officials is that, due to their bad habit, smokers are
responsible for increased spending on healthcare. l07 To combat
this trend, countries should determine how much smokers add to
healthcare costs, and distribute this amount to smokers through
their health insurance premiums and sales taxes on cigarettes.108
Third, another option is to limit the advertisements and spon-
sorships to text-only advertisements. 10 9 Alternatively, tobacco com-
panies could show their product only.110 This would take the image
element out of the advertisement, possibly making the tobacco
products less appealing to youths.'11
B. Tobacco Industry Argument #2: Events Supported by
Tobacco Industry Sponsorship Will Suffer Financial Setbacks.
Since tobacco companies were largely ousted from broadcast-
ing their advertisements on television world-wide, the tobacco in-
dustry channeled plenty of advertising money into other venues,
such as the sporting world.112 One of the most compelling argu-
ments against banning tobacco advertising and sponsorship is that
many sporting and cultural events will lose a significant amount of
support, which may not be replaced."a 3 Although there are other
107. See Diane Francis, Taking the Tobacco War Too Far, MAcIxAN's, Nov. 30,
1987, at 11.
108. See id.
109. See Action on Smoking and Health (ASH) educational pamphlet Tobacco Adver-
tising and Its Legality (visited Nov. 15, 1997) <http://www.ash.org/papers/
h400.html>.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See Jeff Jensen, Non-Tobacco Sponsors Could Fill Void, ADvERrISING AGE,
Sept. 2, 1996, at 34. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. and Philip Morris USA spent a
combined total of over $50 million per year on motor sports. See id.
113. SeeJohn Griffiths, Motor Sport Industry 5, FIN. TiMEs, Jan. 26, 1990, at V.
For example, in Canada, the Alliance for Sponsorship Freedom, a national organi-
zation consisting of over 275 individuals, events and associations, has strongly op-
posed legislation restricting tobacco sponsorship because the legislation will
effectively lead to the inability of events to fund themselves. See Government Set to
Railroad Anti-Sponsorship Bill Through Parliament, CAN. NEWS WIRE, Dec. 3, 1996, at
30. In 1995, tobacco companies gave approximately $60 million in sponsorship
funding, and $200 million in promotional support. See id. Critics of tobacco spon-
sorship prohibitions note that proposed legislation could not come at a worse
time, since the Canadian government has been gradually cutting back its funding
to cultural events. See Anthony Wilson-Smith, Trying to Snuff Out Smoking,
MACLEAN'S, Dec. 9, 1996, at 24.
Motor racing will be the hardest hit, since tobacco companies have substan-
tially funded the motor racing industry for the last 25 years. See Joseph Siano,
Warning: Tobacco Law May Stunt Racing's Growth, N.Y. TimEs, Aug. 29, 1996, at B-15.
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sponsors available to promote sporting and cultural events, these
sponsors have to divide the amount of money they spend on broad-
cast, print and sponsorship advertising, whereas the tobacco indus-
try puts the majority of its advertising money into sponsorship. The
high profile events would probably be able to find sponsors to sup-
plement the amount of money they previously received from to-
bacco companies, however the smaller events would suffer, since
companies would not want to make a substantial financial invest-
ment in events which do not receive significant television
coverage.1 14
One alternative is for tobacco companies to expand into other
product lines, since many countries allow the use of a company's
name for sponsorship purposes, just not the brand name of a to-
bacco product.'1 5 Another alternative is to contribute the money
from the increased taxes imposed on cigarettes to funding sporting
and cultural events.116
Conservative estimates show that tobacco industries have contributed anywhere
from $100 to $250 million per year to the American motor racing industry. See id.
Some possible alternative sponsors include electronic groups, financial man-
agement companies or car companies. See Griffiths, supra at V; see also Gareth
Boreham & Karen Middleton, Rothmans Scraps Million-Dollar Foundation, AGE (Mel-
bourne), June 17, 1994, at 4 (explaining tobacco giant canceled program to pro-
vide millions of dollars to cultural and sporting events, due to restrictions on
tobacco advertising).
114. See Siano, supra note 113, at B-15. Less successful racing teams would
find themselves scrambling for sponsorship dollars, and smaller racetracks would
be forced to charge more for tickets to events or offer less prize money, which
would lead to fewer competitors. See id. Also, money from tobacco companies
helps improve the racetracks at smaller venues, and to advertise the smaller ve-
nues. See id.
The tennis industry in Australia may also suffer, because in two years, it has
not been able to locate a new sponsor to replace its former tobacco company spon-
sor. See Deborah Smith and Anita Catalano, The Toughest Game in Town - Chasing the
Elusive Sponsor, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Austl.), June 2, 1994, at 11. Similarly,
Australia's 1992 silver medal Olympic men's hockey team, ranked in the top four
teams in the world for the last ten years, was sponsor-less from 1988 through 1994,
illustrating that winning games does not guarantee sponsorship. See id. Lack of
sponsorship funds also forced the two-time Australian badminton champion, Tim
Ho, to move to Hong Kong and coach full-time. See id.
115. See Griffiths, supra note 113, at V. For example, in 1989, Philip Morris
spent $13 billion to purchase Kraft Foods as part of a "diversification" program so
that the company was not completely dependent on its tobacco sales for profits.
See id.
116. See Donald Reid, Letter: Stub It Out, OBSERVER (London), July 28, 1996, at
2 (suggesting use of cigarette tax to fund sporting events); Karen Hoggan and
John Warden, Tobacco Sports Link Under Fire, RUETER MARKETING (UK), Feb. 21,
1991, at 2 (explaining former Great Britain Health Secretary proposed to collect
money from European Companies, which would go to sponsorship "pool" for
sporting communities).
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C. Tobacco Industry Argument #3: Link Between Tobacco
Advertising Ban and Decline in Smoking Is Less than Persuasive.
Conventional wisdom leads the general public to believe that
advertising persuades consumers to smoke, and therefore, a ban on
tobacco advertising will discourage consumers from smoking.1 17
Tobacco companies assert that they do not target teenage audi-
ences with their marketing strategies, and further, that evidence
shows that a ban on tobacco advertising would not lead to a decline
in the number of young adults smoking.118
A new study published in ADVERTISING AND MARKETS reveals
that tobacco advertising bans may be "ineffectual or even counter-
productive."'1 19 This conclusion is based on the fact that advertising
tobacco products does not increase total demand for tobacco prod-
ucts, but merely encourages current users to try a new brand.' 20
117. See Roger Bate, The Marlboro Man Can't Make You Smoke, WALL ST. J. (Eu-
ROPE), Jan. 15, 1997, at 6. A study conducted in 1991 by the European Union
determined that young people cited peer pressure for the reason they began smok-
ing in 60% of the cases, and only 1.5% said they began smoking due to tobacco
advertising. See id. The European Union study concluded that young people do
not become aware of tobacco advertising until they become regular smokers. See
id.
Justification for a ban on tobacco advertising is based on three arguments: (1)
the ban of advertising will reduce smoking rates; (2) since public policy dictates
against smoking, tobacco manufactures should not be allowed to promote their
products by advertising their products "in an attractive and socially acceptable
manner"; and (3) it is also a violation of public policy for tobacco companies'
spending on advertisements to be significantly greater than spending on anti-
smoking campaigns. SeeJean J. Boddewyn, Cigarette Advertising Bans and Smoking:
The Flawed Policy Connection, 13 INT'LJ. ADVERTSING 311 (Sept. 22, 1994).
118. See Boddewyn, supra note 117, at 311. For example, tobacco advertising
has been banned in Norway and Finland for several years, but smoking rates in
those countries have remained steady or slightly increased. See id. Also, in coun-
tries with limited restrictions on advertising, such as the United Kingdom, the
Netherlands and Belgium, smoking rates have declined. See id.; see alsoJoan McAl-
pine, Eastern Europe Had the Highest Rate of Smoking in the World Even Though Advertis-
ing Was Prohibited, SCOTSMAN, Feb. 11, 1994, at 1 (noting spokesman for advertising
association believed his industry is not effective because it does not have power to
make people start or stop smoking).
Tobacco companies argue that they are not aiming their advertisements at
children, but rather, that they are attempting to persuade those adults who smoke
to switch to their brand of cigarettes. See Gail Appleson, Ad Executives Say Tobacco
Industry Targets Youths, REuTERS Bus. REP., Dec. 18, 1996, at 1. "Just as you don't
blame General Motors for children who steal cars, nor should you say cigarette
brands initiate kids smoking." Study: Ads Do Influence Teens' Cigarette Choices But
Campaigns Don't Appear to Sway Older Smokers, ARiz. REPuBLC, Aug. 19, 1994, at A5
(quoting Thomas Lauria, spokesman for Tobacco Institute).
119. See Appleson, supra note 118, at 1.
120. See id. As tobacco consumption decreases, tobacco companies advertise
to comer a larger portion of a smaller market. See Diane Francis, Taking the To-
bacco War Too Far, MAcLEAN's, Nov. 30, 1987, at 11.
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A 1993 article in the BRITISH MEDICAL JOuRNAL also suggested
that the link between smoking and advertising is not as clear-cut as
some would think.12 1 As an example of the nebulous relationship
between smoking and advertising, the article relies on smoking sta-
tistics in the former Soviet Union, where smoking has steadily in-
creased in spite of the fact that there is no tobacco advertising in
that region. 122 The author of the article challenged researchers,
who stop their analysis upon finding a relationship between smok-
ing and advertising, to probe deeper, since there are numerous
outside factors which contribute to a person's desire to start or stop
smoking.' 23
In response to the tobacco companies' argument that advertis-
ing does not have a direct adverse effect on the smoking rates of
children, health groups assert the opposite is true.124 In fact, some
believe that tobacco advertising and sponsorship is specifically
targeted at children to induce young people to take up a habit that
could last a lifetime. 125 Opponents of tobacco advertising believe
121. See Simon Chapman, Unraveling Gossamer with Boxing Gloves: Problems in
Explaining the Decline in Smoking, 307 BRIT. MED. J. 429 (Aug. 14, 1993). Rather,
Chapman argues that researchers limit their analysis to linking smoking rates to
advertising and price fluctuations of tobacco products for four main reasons: (1)
the reductionist nature of science - i.e., the scientific community wants concrete
answers and concrete formulas to calculate the answers; (2) the explanatory
privileging of recent events and factors; (3) the pragmatic concern for factors in-
fluenced by public policy, such as advertising, prices and laws restricting smoking
in public; and (4) the fact that health groups fund the research. See id.
Other than advertising, alternative reasons for why children take up smoking
have been suggested, including (1) psychological reasons, such as to reduce stress;
(2) due to relationships with friends, parents, mass media, relatives, etc.; or (3) a
link to the child's socio-cultural environment, such as a culture where men smoke,
but women do not. See Boddewyn, supra note 117, at 311.
122. See Boddewyn, supra note 117, at 311.
123. See id. For example, the author suggests that there is an "interplay of
continuous, uncontrolled, unmeasured, and sometimes unmeasurable variables,"
which may prompt a person to start or stop smoking, aside from tobacco advertis-
ing or fluctuations of the price of cigarettes. See id. Some of these variables in-
clude cultural, demographic, social, physiological, psychological, political, legal
organizational, economic and educational influences, which are difficult to mea-
sure scientifically. See id.
124. See Gail Appleson, Ad Executives Say Tobacco Industry Targets Youths, REU-
TER Bus. REP., Dec. 18, 1996, at 1.
125. See id. This allegation is based on the fact that a recent survey of 300
advertising executives in the United States showed that the executives believed to-
bacco companies market to teenagers. See id. The study showed that 77% of se-
nior advertising executives (those with greater than 20 years experience) believed
that targeting teenagers was a "goal" of tobacco advertising. See id.
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that there is strong evidence which proves tobacco advertising influ-
ences childrens' decision to smoke. 126
While both sides of this debate advance credible arguments,
the fact is that both proponents and opponents of banning tobacco
advertising are at a disadvantage because there are no conclusive
studies on the relationship between advertising and tobacco use. 127
As the United States Surgeon General noted, "[t] he extent of influ-
ence of advertising and promotion on the level of consumption is
unknown and possibly unknowable."'128
D. Tobacco Industry Argument #4: Total Ban Will Prevent
Development and Promotion of Safer Goods.
The tobacco industry argues that, ironically, one of the effects
of a total ban on tobacco advertising is that consumers will not be
informed of safer tobacco products. 12 9 As the smoking community
has become aware of the harmful health effects of tobacco, the to-
bacco industry has developed less harmful alternatives.1 3 0 For ex-
ample, many tobacco companies are currently attempting to
develop a cigarette with minimal second-hand smoke effects on
nonsmokers, however, this type of development may not be success-
ful if the tobacco companies are not able to market their
products. 131
E. Tobacco Industry Argument #5: Total Ban Will Adversely
Affect Other Dangerous Products.
Because governments want to ban tobacco sponsorship in or-
der to limit youths' exposure to dangerous products, it necessarily
126. See Study: Ads Do Influence Teens' Cigarette Choices But Campaigns Don't Ap-
pear To Sway Older Smokers, Aiz. REPUBuC, Aug. 19, 1994, at A5. A 1994 study by
the United States Center for Disease Control determined that the three most pop-
ular cigarette advertising figures, Joe Camel, the Marlboro Man and the couples
depicted in Newport advertisements, captured 86% of the teenage market. See id.;
see also Adrian Vickers, Why Cigarette Advertising Should Be Banned: To Stop Children
from Becoming Addicted to Cigarettes, 304 BRrr. MED. J. 1195 (1992) (stating cigarette
advertisements have influence on children).
127. See Boddewyn, supra note 117, at 311.
128. 1989 ATr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 512-13.
129. See Roger Bate, The Marlboro Man Can't Make You Smoke, WALL ST. J.
(Eur.),Jan. 15, 1997, at 6. Also, if all tobacco advertising is banned, so too will the
health warnings which accompany tobacco advertisements. See id. This could lead
to consumers not being as aware of the harmful effects of using tobacco products.
See id.
130. See id. For example, first tobacco companies developed filters for their
cigarettes, and then developed cigarettes with a lower amount of tar. See id.
131. See id.
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follows that this reasoning will lead to two developments: (1) either
smoking will be declared illegal because it is so harmful; or (2) the
total ban on advertising will be followed by a total ban on advertis-
ing of other harmful products, such as caffeine or alcohol.' 3 2 In
the United States, similar to the studies conducted on children's
ability to recognize Joe Camel, researchers have also determined
that an extraordinary number of teenagers recognize the
"Budweiser Frogs." 133 If the same reasoning that is applied to to-
bacco is used with alcohol, the frogs should no longer be on televi-
sion. In Australia, however, a former Sports Minister indicated that
she had no plans to ban further products, such as alcohol. 34
In France, the Loi Evin bans both tobacco and alcohol sponsor-
ship of sporting events.13 5 France is currently in the middle of a
controversy regarding the 1998 World Cup, to be held in Paris. 13 6
Anheuser Busch, maker of Budweiser beer, entered a sponsorship
contract to promote its beer products during the World Cup.' 37
France's new Sports Minister, however, is standing strong against
132. See Francis, supra note 107, at 11. (comparing tobacco advertising bans to
banning car advertisements to reduce pollution from emissions). "Taking aim at
everything in life that can ruin one's health is as foolish as smoking two packs a
day." Id.; see alsoJohn Lewis, Ban Looms Over Adsfor Alcoho4 MARKETING (UK), Feb.
17, 1994, at 4 (explaining, in Great Britain, alcohol advertising and sponsorship
will be attacked after tobacco). But see Charles Krauthammer, The New Prohibition-
ism, TIME, Oct. 6, 1997, at 112 (explaining alcohol sponsorship is as pervasive as
tobacco sponsorship, yet alcohol sponsorship is not being prohibited). "TV sports
in particular, a staple of adolescents, is one long hymn to the glories of beer." Id.
Krauthammer asserts that the perils of alcohol are far more dangerous than that of
tobacco. See id. In support of this proposition, he suggests, "[a]sk yourself this: If
you knew your child was going to become addicted to either alcohol or tobacco,
which would you choose?" Id.
133. See While Teens Recognize Ad Icons Such as Joe Camel and the Budweiser Frogs,
Teens Try Those Brands Only Occasionally, A New USA Today Study Shows, Bus. WIRE,
Jan. 30, 1997, at 1. A USA TODAY study showed that 99% of the teenagers surveyed
recognized the Budweiser Frogs, yet less than 10% said the advertisements influ-
enced the teens to drink the Budweiser brand of beer. See id. Further, 93% of the
teenagers said they liked the Budweiser Frogs, yet Budweiser "is almost no teens
favorite beer brand." Id. Rather, teenagers preference for beer depends on the
region in which they live. See id. See also Krauthammer, supra note 132, at 112
("Joe Camel has been banished forever, but those beloved Budweiser frogs ...
keep marching along, right into the consciousness of every TV-watching kid in the
country.").
134. See Elisabeth Tacey & Gary Mead, Sport Goes Up in Smoke, FIN. TIMES
(London), May 28, 1992, at 18. In fact, former Sports Minister, Ros Kelly, sug-
gested there is not a safe level of intake for tobacco, as compared to alcohol, since
"moderate drinking may even be good for you." Id.
135. See Law No. 91-32 of Jan. 10, 1991, J.O., Jan. 12, 1991, p. 615. For a
discussion of the Loi Evin, see supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
136. See Adam Sage, World Cup Ad Ban Brews Sponsor Row, LONDON TIMES, June
17, 1997, at 15.
137. See id.
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Anheuser Busch's planned sponsorship, relying on the Loi Evin.1 38
One suggested proposal is to make the World Cup stadium "extra-
territoriale" for the duration of the competition.15 9 Anheuser
Busch has spoken with French government officials and the Euro-
pean Commission in hopes of relaxing the requirements of the Loi
Evin.140
TV. IMPACT
Given the importance of sporting events in our society, and a
nation's obligation to protect the health of its children, nations
must strike a delicate balance between these two concerns. Most
likely, tobacco companies will continue to be restricted, and nations
may eventually implement a complete ban on tobacco advertising
and sponsorship.
Advanced technology may be able to play a part in reducing
children's exposure to tobacco advertising. One option currently
being developed is to substitute tobacco broadcast images with
computer-generated images.141 This technology could substitute
any two-dimensional image broadcast at sporting events, and could
even create "virtual" billboards where none previously existed, thus
reducing children's television exposure to cigarette advertising, and
allowing sporting events to retain their tobacco company
sponsorships. 142
If countries follow through with proposed total bans on to-
bacco sponsorship, tobacco companies could take their sponsor-
ship money to a location where tobacco sponsorship is not under
siege. 143 Especially in the motor racing world, many countries
138. See id. France's former government was willing to make an exception to
the Loi Evin for the World Cup. See id. The new Communist Sports Minister,
Marie-George Buffet, however, has indicated she will fight Anheuser Busch's spon-
sorship. See id.
139. See Passport to Paris, FIN. TIMES (Fr.), Feb. 3, 1997, at 19. This proposal
would make the stadium akin to an independent state for the World Cup event,
exempt from French laws. See id.
140. See Budweiser's Sporting Chance, CAMPAIGN (Fr.), Apr. 4, 1997, at 12.
Anheuser hopes to escape the Loi Evin restrictions by emphasizing the worldwide
impact of the World Cup competition. See id.
141. See AndrewJack, Now You See It, Now You Don't - The Implications of a Device
That Substitutes Broadcast Images, FIN. TimES, Nov. 4, 1994, at 12. This technology
was originally developed for the aerospace industry. See id.
142. See id.
143. See Alan Henry, Racing Car Industry Could Disappear in Lack of Smoke,
GuARDIAN (Gr. Brit.),Jan. 10, 1997, at 26 (explaining auto racing in Great Britain
could be threatened by tobacco sponsorship restrictions).
1998]
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would welcome the publicity with open arms. 144 In the Formula
One racing series, for example, six out of the twelve major racing
teams are sponsored by tobacco companies, and many countries
would stand to gain recognition by hosting this event.145
In Australia, the Tobacco Prohibition Act of 1992 (TAPA) cur-
rently governs tobacco sponsorship, but the real issue is the excep-
tions to the rule which have temporarily provided the tobacco
industry with loopholes around the law.146 In the United States, in
light of Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA and the ongoing tobacco settle-
ment negotiations, there are still many unanswered questions and
many battles to be fought over tobacco sponsorship. 147 In Canada,
the recent enactment of the Tobacco Act may turn the tide against
the tobacco industry, providing that the new law is not challenged
by the tobacco companies.' 48 Finally, in France, the upcoming
1998 World Cup soccer event could lead to the first real challenge
of the language of the Loi Evin.14 9
Besides those countries discussed in this Comment, other
countries are beginning to place pressure on the tobacco compa-
nies.150 This is a trend which is likely to continue. For example,
both Belgium and Turkey recently announced that they were going
to ban tobacco sponsorship of sporting events. 151 Similarly, Mex-
ico, Hungary, Latvia, Brazil and Belgium have either limited or are
considering limiting tobacco sponsorship. 52
144. See id. ("A lot of countries a long way from [Great Britain] are prepared
to spend a lot of money to have a grand prix").
145. See id.
146. For a discussion of TAPA and the current state of Australian law, see
supra notes 19-45 and accompanying text.
147. For a discussion of the Coyne Beahm decision, see supra notes 66-86 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the tobacco settlement negotiations, see
supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
148. For a discussion of the state of Canadian law and the Tobacco Act, see
supra notes 46-57 and accompanying text.
149. For a discussion of the state of tobacco sponsorship in France, see supra
notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
150. For example, in one of the last moves while Hong Kong was subject to
British rule, the government banned all tobacco advertising of sporting and cul-
tural events. See Ad Age's World Wire, ADVERTISING AGE, June 30, 1997, at 31.
151. See Roger Bate, The Marlboro Man Can't Make You Smoke, WALL ST. J.
(EuR.), Jan. 15, 1997, at 6. Belgium's ban on tobacco sponsorship will be imple-
mented in 1999. See id. Belgium's ban followed Turkey's ban, which became effec-
tive in December of 1996. See id.
152. See Mike France, The World War on Tobacco, Bus. WK, Nov. 11, 1996, at 99.
"While tobacco has always been highly regulated, the current international
clampdown is unprecedented." Id. (quoting statement of David Sweanor, senior
legal counsel for Canada's Non-Smokers' Rights Association).
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In light of the foregoing, it is evident that this area of law is still
in the early stages of development. Until nations establish a defini-
tive and somewhat consistent rule on tobacco advertising at sport-
ing events, it is likely both sides of the debate will be forced to
compromise.
Robin A. Longaker
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